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Johnson v. Commonwealth
591 S.E.2d 47 (Va. 2004)
. Faas
In 1998, Shermaine A. Johnson ("Johnson") was convicted of the rape and
capital murder of Hope Denise Hall ("Hall") and sentenced to death.' After
unsuccessfully challenging his death sentence on direct appeal, Johnson filed a
habeas petition in the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 In his petition, Johnson
alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing "to request
an instruction informing the jury that Johnson would be ineligible for parole if
sentenced to life imprisonment."3 Pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Sin m v Sout Crzdir 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that Johnson was entitled to an instruction concerning his parole ineligibility
because his future dangerousness was at issue.' The Supreme Court of Virginia
vacated Johnson's death sentence and remanded his case for a new sentencing
hearing by a different jury." The resentencing jury, finding that both predicates
of future dangerousness and vileness existed, recommended a death sentence.7
The circuit court once again sentenced Johnson to death.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Johnson challenged the
constitutionality of the resentencing proceeding.9 Johnson claimed that the
proceeding was a violation of double jeopardy and that he was improperly
restricted from cross-examining "live" witnesses."0 Johnson also argued that he
presented sufficient evidence to necessitate a mental retardation determination."
Lastly, Johnson claimed that it would be a violation of the Eighth Amendment's
1. Johnson v. Commonvwah, 591 S.E2d 47,49 (Va. 2004); seeVA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-
31(5) (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that premeditated murder committed in the commission of rape
or attempted rape qualifies as capital murder). The trial court also sentenced Johnson to life
imprisonment for the rape of Hall. J]bar, 591 S.Ed at 49.
2. Jdomro 591 S.E.2d at 49.
3. Id
4. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).




9. Id at 56-57.
10. Id at 56, 58.
11. Jadmr4 591 S.E.2d at 58.
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ban on cruel and unusual punishment to sentence him to death for crimes
committed when he was sixteen years old. 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Johnson's double jeopardyclaim
was procedurally barred because he failed to raise it during the resentencing
proceeding. 3 The court determined that the circuit court properly restricted
Johnson's abilityto cross-examine witnesses on issues relating to his guilt. 4 In
addition, the court held that Johnson's mental retardation claim was frivolous
and did not warrant remand for jury consideration. 5 The Supreme Court of
Virginia also reaffirmed its position that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit the execution of juvenile defendants.16 Finally, the court concluded that
Johnson's sentence was not imposed arbitrarily and was not disproportionate to
the sentences imposed in similar capital cases."
X. Ar nsis
A. Resarn Pkx gC
Johnson first argued that the resentencing proceeding violated double
jeopardy principles." In support of his argument, Johnson presented two
affidavits from jurors explaining that they would not have voted for the death
penalty in Johnson's first trial if they had known that he was ineligible for
parole.' 9 Additionally, Johnson claimed that the proceeding violated double
jeopardy "because the prosecution acted in 'bad faith' at his first trial by failing
to require that the jury be instructed correctly regarding the parole eligibility
12. Id at 59. In addition to these claims, Johnson raised a number of arguments that the
Supreme Court of Virginia summarily dismissed. ld at 56. Johnson's additional claims were that:
(1) "Virginia's capital murder sentencing statutes fail to provide meaningful guidance to the jury
concerning the meani of the terms 'future dangerousness'and 'vileness"; (2) "Virginia's statutory
scheme fails to properly inform and instruct the jury concerning its consideration of mitigation
evidence"; (3) the Commonwealth is improperly allowed to use unadjudicated criminal conduct to
prove future dangerousness; (4) Virginia's capital system is unconstitutional because the sentencing
statutes "allow, but do not require, the court to set aside a death sentence on a showing of good
cause and permit the court to consider hearsay evidence in the pre-sentence report"; and (5) that
the Supreme Court of Virginia "fails to conduct its proportionality and 'passion-prejudice' review
consistent with constitutional requirements." Id
13. Id at 57.
14. Id at 58.
15. Id at 59.
16. Id at 60 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)).
17. Jkmcn, 591 S.E.2d at 60-61.
18. Id at 56.
19. Id at 56-57.
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issue." 2  The Supreme Court of Virginia did not consider these claims on the
merits because it concluded that they were procedurally barred based on John-
son's failure to raise them at the resentencing proceeding.2'
In addition, Johnson argued that the circuit court acted improperly by
allowing "live" witness testimony while restricting his ability to cross-examine
witnesses.22 Johnson claimed that it was error for the circuit court to prevent
him "from challenging the veracity of that testimony before the jury."23 Relying
on its decision in A ik / v Ctnwuah,24 the Supreme Court of Virginia stated
that a defendant may not "challenge the Commonwealth's evidence of guilt
during the penalty phase" or "argue during the penalty phase proceedings that
there is a 'residual doubt' concerning his guilt."25 Accordingly, the court rejected
Johnson's arguments and affirmed the circuit court's decision to restrict the
defense from questioning witnesses on issues regarding Johnson's guilt.26
B. Menal Reradatian Caim
Johnson also claimed that his case should be remanded for ajurydetermina-
tion of whether he should be classified as mentally retarded under section 19.2-
264.3:1.1 of the Virginia Code. He argued that he had "presented sufficient
20. Id at 57.
21. Id; see VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25 (stating that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of the
trial court or the commission before which the case was initiallytried unless the objection was stated
with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling"); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112
(2003) (plurality opinion) (stating that double jeopardy will only apply to capital sentencing
proceedings if the juryunaninmuslyfinds that the State failed to prove that one or more aggravating
factor existed). Because Johnson was sentenced to death in his first trial, it is clear that the jusy
found that at least one aggravating factor existed. Thus, the Supreme Court's ruling in Sawahn
precludes Johnson's argument that double jeopardy had attached. Se geavUy Priya Nath, Case
Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 419 (2003) (analyzing Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 S. Ct. 732 (2003));
Whitnan J. Hou, G " RanRals and Rismria .W to Atpl and moin4R g Faas, 16 CAP.
DEF.J. 19, 22 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Sarazah.
22. J]hmo, 591 S.E.2d at 57-58.
23. Id
24. 534 S.E2d 312 (Va. 2000).
25. fobmcm, 591 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va.
2000)); Atkits, 534 S.E.2d at 314. The Supreme Court of Virginia's rationale is based on the
premise that "the issue of a defendant's guilt has alreadybeen decided at the guilt phase of a capital
murder trial" and is therefore not at issue in the sentencing proceeding. Id
26. Jobmrn 591 S.E.2d at 58.
27. Id The Virginia Code defines "mentally retarded" as:
A] disabilit, on'rating before the age of 18 years, characterized concurrently by
Ssignifi . suverageintellectual functionig as demonstrated byperformance
on a srta=rzed measure of intellectual functioning administered in conformit
with accepted professional practice, that is at least two standard deviations below the
mean and (i) significant liitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual,
social and practcal adaptive skills.
2004]
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evidence, including evidence of his low I.Q. scores and his [Dissociative Identity
Disorder], which demonstrates that his claim is not frivolous."" Under section
8.01-654.2 of the Virginia Code, the Supreme Court of Virginia may dismiss a
petition for a mental retardation determination if the court finds the claim to be
frivolous .29 The statutory test for mental retardation requires the defendant to
provide proof of subaverage intellectual functioning and significantly limited
adaptive behavior, and that these traits originated before the defendant was
eighteen years old.3" If a defendant satisfies this two-part test, his claim will not
be found frivolous.3' However, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that John-
son's mental retardation claim was frivolous because his I.Q. "exceed[ed] the
score of 70 that the General Assembly has chosen as the threshold score below
which one may be classified as being mentally retarded."32
C Jwnie Doub Penalty Clam
Johnson contended that it was error for the circuit court to sentence him
to death for crimes committed when he was sixteen years old." Johnson urged
the Supreme Court of Virginia to applythe rationale of A tkim v Viginia,"4 which
relied on "evolving standards of decency" in concluding that the execution of a
mentally retarded defendant constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 5 John-
son argued that these same "evolving standards of decency" should apply to
executions of juvenile defendants. 6 Instead, the Supreme Court of Virginia
relied on Staiford v Kenuey,3  in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the execution of juvenile defendants is not a violation of the Eighth Amend-
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003).
28. jdamon, 591 S.E.2d at 58.
29. Id at 58-59 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654.2 (Michie 2000)).
30. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).
31. Jdchmc, 591 S.E.2d at 59.
32. a s AM. PsYcI-IATRIC ASWN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, 39 (4thed. 1994) [hereinafter APA] (stating that "[s]ignificantlysubaverage intellectual
functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below (approximately 2 standard deviations below
the mean)"). Intellectual functioning tests showed that Johnson "had an I.Q. score of 75 in 1991,
and an I.Q. score of 78 in 1992." Id at 51; seBums v. Warden, No. 020971, at 1, 2 (Va. Oct. 28,
2003) (reh'g granted) (order on file with author) (providing an example of a nonfrivolous mental
retardation claim).
33. J]bma, 591 S.E.2d at 59.
34. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
35. Joimson, 591 S.E.2d at 59-60 (cting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002)); sw U.S.
ONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishments").
36. Jcbmn, 591 S.E.2d at 59-60.
37. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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ment.3" In applying Stforda the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that it was not
at liberty to disregard directly applicable federal precedent. 9
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the possibilitythat
the issue of juvenile executions might involve an independent state constitutional
question."0 The court initiallynoted that Johnson did not challenge the juvenile
death penaltyunder the Constitution of Virginia."' The court's statement implies
that the question of juvenile executions is a state constitutional question that the
Virginia courts maydecide. Yet the court went on to state that "[i]n the absence
of such a [federal] constitutional prohibition . . . any further determination
whether 16 and 17-year-old persons convicted of capital murder should be
eligible to receive the death penalty in Virginia is a matter to be decided by the
General Assembly, not by the courts. " 2 Read together, the court's statements
do not clarify whether the juvenile execution issue is a Virginia constitutional
question for the courts or a question solely within the purview of the General
Assembly. Relying solelyon federal constitutional precedent, the Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's imposition of the death sentence even
though Johnson was a juvenile at the time he committed the murder. 3
D. Stautry Senmere Reuew
The Supreme Court of Virginia also performed the mandatory review of
Johnson's death sentence pursuant to section 17.1-313(Q of the Virginia Code."
The first part of the statutory review required the court to consider whether
Johnson's death sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice
38. Jd)mo 591 S.E.2d at 59 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)). Like
Jobmomn, the defendant in Stafr was sixteen years old at the time he committed the offense. Ra
39. Id at 60. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Johnson's contention that the court
should applythe rationale of the United States Supreme Court in A tkim because of the likelihood
that the United States Supreme Court would reverse Stao l The court stated that "[wlhen a
precedent of the Supreme Court has direct application in a case, we are not at libertyto ignore that
precedent in favor of other Supreme Court decisions employing a similar analysis in a different
factual and legal context." Id
40. Seeid at 60 n.* (discussing Johnson's failure to challenge the juvenile death penaltyunder
the Constitution of Virginia).
41. Sw id (stating that "[wle note that in this appeal Johnson does not challenge under any
provision of the Constitution of Virginia the imposition of the death penaltyfor 16 and 17-year-old
persons convicted of capital murder").
42. Id at 60.
43. I
44. Jd7cbo 591 S.E.2d at 60; seeVA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(Q(1) (Michie 2003) (requiring
the Supreme Court of Virginia to consider "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor"); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(Q(2)
(requiring the Supreme Court of Virginia to consider "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive




or anyother arbitrary factor."4" The court concluded that there was no evidence
that Johnson's death sentence was imposed arbitrarily.46
The second part of the court's mandatoryreview concerned whetherJohn-
son's death sentence was proportionate to the sentences imposed in similar
capital cases.4" The court stated that it compared the record in Johnson's case
"with the records of our other capital murder cases, including those cases in
which a life sentence has been imposed."4 In reviewing the records, the court
paid particular attention to capital cases involving a death sentence based on both
future dangerousness and vileness.49 After "considering both the crime and the
defendant," the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Johnson's death
sentence was proportionate to the sentences imposed in similar capital cases."0
The court held that no evidence of reversible error existed and affirmed the
circuit court's ruling.5'
IV. Applicaion in Vina
A. Remweindg Testirnqy
InJdmc, the Supreme Court of Virginia approved the Commonwealth's
presentation of live testimonyduring the resentencing proceeding. 2 In addition,
the court upheld the circuit court's decision to restrict Johnson's abilityto cross-
examine the witnesses on issues related to his guilt. 3 The rationale behind the
restriction on cross-examination is based on the premise that the issue of a
defendant's guilt is fullylitigated and decided in the first phase of a capital trial54
According to the Supreme Court of Virginia inA tkim, a defendant maynot raise
issues of "residual doubt" as mitigation evidence during the sentencing proceed-
ing."5 The problem inherent in such restriction is that it effectively precludes
45. Jab , 591 S.E.2d at 60; VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(1).
46. Jdmon, 591 S.E.2d at 60.
47. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2);Jdmra, 591 S.E.2d at 60.
48. jdmorn 591 S.E.2d at 61.
49. Id In conducting its proportionality review, the court also considered factors such as
Johnson's age at the time of the offense, evidence of prior rapes, and the vileness of the murder of
Hal Id; seVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(2) (requiring the court to "consideri] both the crime
and the defendant").
50. Johmcr, 591 S.E.2d at 61. It is clear that the court construed "similar offenses" narrowly
to mean capital murders based on both statutoryaggravators involving violent sexual crimes where




54. Id at 57.
55. At/tin, 534 S.E.2d at 315; swJeremy P. White, Case Note, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 429, 430
(2001) (analyzing Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000)).
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cross-examination. If the defendant is barred from relitigating his guilt or raising
issues of "residual doubt" at sentencing, then the defense has little left to cross-
examine the witness about. As Johnson argued, the new resentencing jury may
not be "able to 'gain the same feel' for the case due to his inability to challenge
the Commonwealth's evidence."56 The prohibition on the defendant's abilityto
raise issues related to his guilt at his resentencing deprives the newly impaneled
jury of the full picture of the case, which the first sentencing jury had when
making its decision. Thus, the statutory scheme regarding live witness testimony
at resentencing proceedings appears to put defendants at an immediate disadvan-
tage.
B. Merd Reandatin Claim
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Johnson's mental retardation
claim was frivolous because his level of intellectual functioning was not suffi-
ciently subaverage." The statute requires that the defendant score "at least two
standard deviations below the mean" on a standardized intelligence test." The
court read this language in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's ("APA") definition of mental retardation in determining that a "score of
70 ... [is] the threshold score belowubidb one maybe classified as being mentally
retarded." 9 Thus, the court's analysis requires a defendant to score a sixtynine
or lower in order to qualify as mentally retarded.
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation differs from the
APA's definition in two ways. First, the APA specifies that a score of seventy,
which is two standard deviations below the mean, permits a finding of mental
retardation.60 Second, the APA explicitlystates that a margin of error of 5 points
exists for all standardized tests.6 Taking the statistical margin of error into
account, Johnson's I.Q. score of 75 would qualify for a possible mental retarda-
tion diagnosis under the APA's definition. Thus, had the Supreme Court of
Virginia applied the APA definition, taking into account the margin of error, it
should have deemed Johnson's claim nonfrivolous.
C Jzeinie Dazk Pemit
In its discussion of the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia "note[d] that in this appealJohnson does not challenge under anyprovision
56. Jdm on, 591 S.E.2d at 57.
57. Id at 59.
58. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (Mchie Supp. 2003).
59. Jdmo ; 591 S.E.2d at 59 (emphasis added); see APA, supra note 32, at 39 (stating that
general intellectual functioning "is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below").




of the Constitution of Virginia the imposition of the death penaltyfor 16 and 17-
year-old persons convicted of capital murder."62  This statement appears to
acknowledge that a state constitutional question exists. However, the court goes
on to hold that the General Assembly, and not the courts, is responsible for
determining whether juveniles are eligible to receive the death penalty.63 The
court's statements appear contradictoryin that theyacknowledge a constitutional
question but assign the responsibility for deciding that question to the General
Assembly. Thus, it is unclear whether the Virginia courts are willing to entertain
state constitutional claims regarding the juvenile death penalty. In the event that
a court is open to such a claim, capital defense attorneys should be prepared to
make the argument based on the Constitution of Virginia that juveniles are death
ineligible.
Capital defense attorneys must also be aware of State ec n Sirr m
Roer,64 in which the Supreme Court of Missouri held "that the Supreme Court
of the United States would hold that the execution of persons for crimes com-
mitted when they were under 18 years of age violates the 'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment."" The United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari in Sirmnr and will therefore decide whether the execution of juveniles
violates the Eighth Amendment.66 The Court's decision will have a significant
effect on how the Virginia courts treat the juvenile death penalty issue. If
Sirnnm is affirmed, then the Eighth Amendment question is resolved for
Virginia. If Sirwmo is reversed, then the question remains whether the juvenile
death penalty issue should be handled by the Virginia courts or the General
Assembly. Thus, the United States Supreme Court's decision will significantly
impact how defense attorneys in Virginia will argue juvenile capital cases.
D. Prkimd yRew
Injerhim v Qwmnuaith, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that
the primaryinquiry of its proportionality review was" 'whether other sentencing
62. Jdi'rncm 591 S.E.2d at 60 n.*. The court's statement appears to indicate that Johnson
should have made a challenge under the Constitution of Virginia. Yet, the comment is curious
considering that the Constitution of Virginia provides no direct authority on the question whether
it is cruel and unusual to execute a juvenile. For a motion to declare the juvenile death penalty
unconstitutional under the Virginia Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause, please contact the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
63. Id at 60.
64. 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
65. State cc td. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003).
66. Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, 2004 WL 110849, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004) (mee.)
(grting certiorar).
67. 423 S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1992).
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bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable
or similar crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant."' 68 In order to
make this determination, the court compiles the records of similar capital murder
cases for comparison. 9 InJabmcn, the court stated that it "reviewed the records
of all capital cases considered bythis Court" and paid particular attention to cases
"in which the death sentence was /asedon both predicates." 7" On the same day
that it decided Jckmon, the Supreme Court of Virginia also decided Jadeson v
Gmrnw dWT and Hudsonv Qnmwmald7 . Injadescon the court also stated that
it compared Jackson's case to other similar cases where "the death penalty was
imposed based upon the future dangerousness aggravating factor."' However,
in Hudson the court explained that it reviewed capital cases "where the Common-
wealth saogitthe death penaltybased upon the aggravating factors of vileness and
future dangerousness."74 The inconsistency in the court's language leaves open
the question of what constitutes a "similar" case. It is unclear whether a "sini-
lar" case is one in which the Commonwealth soft the same aggravator/s, or one
in which the sentence was based on the same aggravator/s.75
V. C ni
Afterjobon, it is unclear whether the Virginia courts are willing to entertain
state constitutional challenges to the juvenile death penalty. Lawyers should be
prepared to challenge a juvenile death sentence under the Constitution of Vir-
ginia in the event that a court is willing to hear such a claim. In addition, lawyers
68. Jdmcrn 591 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (Va.
1992)).
69. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(E) (lchie 2003) (stating that "[the Supreme Court may
accumulate the records of all capital felony cases ... [and] shall consider such records as are
available as a guide in determining whether the sentence imposed in the case under review is
excessive"). For a more complete discussion of the problems associated with the Supreme Court
of Virginia's compilation of records for proportionality review, se Cynthia M Bruce, Pmponaniy
Reuew Still Intda; But Still Nemsar,; 14 CAP. DEF. J. 265, 268-69 (2002) and Jessie A. Seiden,
Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 625 (2004) (analyzing Palmer v. Clarke, No. 4:00CV3020, 2003 WL
2232710, at *1 (D. Neb. Oct. 9, 2003)).
70. Jobr5hcm 591 S.E.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
71. 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004).
72. S&-Hudson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 362 (Va. 2004) (finding the defendant's death
sentence proportionate to the sentences imposed in similar capital murder cases); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004) (finding that the defendant's death sentence was not
the result of passion or prejudice and was proportional to sentences in similar cases).
73. jades&, 590 S.E.2d at 537 (emphasis added).
74. Hudso, 590 S.E.2d at 364 (emphasis added); s&-Jessie A. Seiden, Case Note, 16 CAP.
DEF.J. 529 (2004) (analyzing Hudson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 362 (Va. 2004)).
75. For a more complete discussion concerning the significance of this difference in language,
swMaxwellC Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 533 (2004) (analyzing (Jerry) Jacksonv. Common-
wealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004)).
2004]
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must be aware of Sinmm and anticipate the forthcoming United States Supreme
Court decision regarding juvenile executions and the Eighth Amendment. If
Sim is affirmed, Virginia will no longer be able to execute juveniles. How-
ever, if Simnm is reversed and Virginia maintains the death penalty for juveniles,
the question remains whether it is an issue for the courts or the General Assem-
blyto decide. Attorneys must carefully observe how the United States Supreme
Court resolves this issue because of the major implications such a decision will
have on the manner in which juvenile capital cases are argued in Virginia.
Jessie A. Seiden
